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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The issues presented on appeal consist of the following:

1)

Whether the Respondent's statements during its television broadcast that
the Appellant was involved in a possible cover-up of criminal activities
during a County Attorney's Office criminal investigation constituted
slander per se as alleging Appellant had committed a crime or that his
conduct was incompatible with the exercise of a lawful business, trade,
profession, or office and

was therefore actionable; 2) whether the trial

judge acted properly in making his determination that if a statement is
capable of at least two different interpretations, then, as a matter of
law, the Respondent's statements could not be slanderous per se, or whether
it was an issue of fact more properly left to the jury,
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
presiding, granted Summary Judgment in favor of Respondents.

The trial

court held that where allegedly defamatory words in a television broadcast
are capable of two different interpretations, one interpretation applying
to the Appellant's personal reputation and the other to his professional
reputation, a public official could not sue for either libel or slander per
se.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant, Don Harman ("Appellant"), is Chief Investigator for
the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office and has been so employed for the
last fifteen years (Complaint, paragraphs 1-2). He has had the confidence
of his employer and has been of good reputation in the community and among
-1-

his colleagues and peers in the law enforcement community (Complaint,
paragraph 3).

The A p p e l l a n t ' s r e p u t a t i o n as an honest and outstanding

police o f f i c e r / i n v e s t i g a t o r

is essential to his a b i l i t y to perform his

employment to the standards set by his employment (Complaint, paragraph 4 ) .
On November 8, 1984, at approximately 10:00 p.m., during one of
the Respondent, KTVX's news broadcasts, the Respondent,

Phil Riesen, an

employee of KTVX, stated "the news comes mid the allegations that a recent
Salt Lake County Attorney's investigation on the same subject may e n t a i l a
cover-up11 (Complaint, paragraph 9 ) .

Then the Respondent,

John Harrington,

an employee of KTVX, narrated a television broadcast displaying

a picture

of the Appellant stating:
"Don Harman is the c h i e f i n v e s t i g a t o r f o r the Salt Lake County
Attorney's O f f i c e .

As such he supervised the c o r r u p t i o n probe of the

County Constable o p e r a t i o n .

As part of t h a t , he investigated a car sale

that took place at t h i s West Valley City car l o t .
called that sale i l l e g a l .

At l e a s t one Constable

Don Harman participated in the sale, putting him

in the position of investigating himself.

Here is what happened:

West Valley City Constable, Scott Stoweirs picked up an
$8,000 car on a court order. Stowers was the focus of
the County's probe. Salt Lake County Constable, Lynn
Huffman says the sale was kept secret so i n s i d e r s had a
chance t o get the car cheap.
Harman bid low. The
vehicle ended up going f o r $3,200. This report i s the
f r u i t of the County Attorney's Constable corruption and
investigation. Even though the probe uncovered wrong
doing, i t f e l l short of criminal charges. In an interview today, County Attorney Ted Cannon said he was
personally i n v e s t i g a t i n g Harman's investigation in the
car sale. We asked Cannon i f Harman's actions may have
dampened Harman's zeal to pursue the corruption probe
further. Said Cannon ' I c a n ' t say t h a t i s n ' t s o . ' Now
that the Attorney General's office and the Salt Lake City
Police Department are both investigating the c o r r u p t i o n
of the Constable system, and now t h a t the
County
Attorney's investigation has been reopened, Law Enforce-

ment officials are saying privately they expect criminal
charges to be filed and that those charges may even
extend in the State Department of Social Services."
(Complaint, paragraph 12).
The communicated
cover-up and

information

about the Appellant's

alleged

improper involvement in the Corruption probe was false,

malicious, defamatory and made in reckless disregard of the facts (Complaint, paragraph 15). On November 9, 1984, the Appellant contacted the
Respondent, KTVX, by telephone and
acy of the their

told the Respondent

about the inaccur-

November 8, 1984 broadcast concerning the Appellant;

despite this conversation the Respondent

again aired the above

informa-

tion on its newscast of November 9, 1984 (Complaint, paragraph 2 2 ) .
Respondents 1 broadcasts were heard and seen throughout Utah and the
Intermountain West by thousands of viewers; as a result, the Appellant was
exposed to public hatred, contempt and ridicule and injured his reputation
in his profession and in his community (Complaint, paragraphs 14 and 16).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In point I of this Brief, the Appellant contends that, in light of
recent Utah Supreme Courts decisions, the Respondents 1 statements and
allegations made about the Appellant constituted slander per se and are
actionable; these statements are actionable in that they impute criminal
conduct to the Appellant

and that his conduct was incompatible with the

exercise of lawful business, trade, profession, or office.
In point II of this Brief, Appellant
Respondents 1 statements about the Appellant

contends that if the

were capable of at least two

different meanings, one of which is defamatory the other innocent, then it
would be proper to submit the issue to the jury to determine the manner in
-3-

which it was actually understood.
ately to each issue:

This approach should be applied separ-

that of imputation of criminal conduct to Appellant

and to conduct incompatible with the exercise of a lawful business.
ARGUMENT
Point I
RESPONDENTS1 BROADCAST STATEMENTS CONCERNING
APPELLANT CONSTITUTED SLANDER PER SE
A.

The Respondents 1 statements that the Appellant was involved
in a cover-up imputed criminal conduct to the Appellant and
was therefore slander per se.

In the case of Baum v. Gillman, 667 p.2d 41 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme
Court faced a situation in which the allegedly defamatory statements about
the Appellant

had been made orally.

There the court defined defamation

per se as follows:
"In order to constitute defamation per se, the defamatory
words must charge criminal conduct, loathsome disease,
conduct that is incompatible with the exercise of a
lawful business, trade, profession, or office, or the
unchastity of a woman."
Jd. at 43.
The facts of the instant case clearly support the allegation that
defendants charged plaintiff with criminal conduct.

The Respondents 1

broadcast stated:
The news comes mid allegations that a recent Salt Lake
County Attorney's investigation on the same subject may
entail a cover-up. John Harrington has more on the
developments in this report."
After making that introductory allegation, the broadcast went on
to state that the Appellant

was the chief investigator of the County

Attorney's Office; that he supervised the corruption probe; that he had a

-4-

motive to cover up the criminal investigation; that his zeal to pursue the
corruption probe may have been dampened and that there may be criminal
charges filed.
These facts as alleged impute criminal conduct by the Appellant
and clearly fall within prior Utah case law.

The test of "whether defama-

tory words are actionable per se is to be determined by their injurious
character.

The words must be of such common notoriety that damage can be

presumed from the words alone," Baum, 667 P.2d at 43, and the words are to
be construed according to their usual popular and common acceptance.
Western States Title Insurance Co. v. Warnock, 18 Utah 2d 70, 415 P.2d 316,
318 (1966).

The purpose of such a requirement is to create a presumption

that the Appellant

has suffered pecuniary damage without the necessity of

pleading and proving special damages; thus, the court can legally presume
that the Appellant

has been damaged.

Utah 74, 83 p. 573 (1905).

Nicholls v. Daily Reporter Co., 30

The effect of this requirement is that where

there is no slander per se, i.e., oral defamation falling within at least
one of the four arbitrary categories, and no libel per se, i.e., written
defamation that holds a person up to hatred, ridicule of contempt, damages
are not presumed from the words alone, but must be specifically plead and
proved.
In the present case, the defendants alleged that the Appellant was
involved in a cover-up of a Salt Lake County Attorney's Office criminal
investigation.

These words must be construed according to their "usual

popular and common acceptance."

Perhaps such words would not have denoted

criminal conduct twenty, thirty or forty years ago, but that is not the
test.

The test is whether such words, construed according to their usual
-5-

popular and common acceptance, would denote criminal conduct in contemporary society.
the media.

In the past decade the term cover-up has been prominent in

A former United States Attorney General was sentenced to prison

for his part in the "cover-up" of "Watergate".

Because of that and other

media exposure, the term "cover-up" has taken on a meaning synonymous with
criminal conduct.

According to

the above cited case law, the Respondents1

statements do indeed allege criminal conduct by the Appellant
fore are actionable.
Appellant

and there-

It is not necessary to allege further that the

has suffered any special damage; the damage is presumed from the

injurious character of the criminal allegation.
This conclusion is supported by the Utah Supreme Court's decision
in Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325 (1975).

In that case the Respondent

had made several written and oral statements that the Appellant

was a

drunk, a "clever crook" and that he was "stealing from his own children..."
referring to his operation of a business, and his efforts to sell it. J[d at
327-328.

The court noted that general statements about another being a

"crook" might not be actionable, but that it depended on the circumstances
of each case.

Ic^. The court continued:

If words of that character are used in such a context or
under such circumstances as they would reasonably be
understood to come within the traditional requirement of
libel or slander: that is, to hold a person up to
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to injure him in his
business or vocation, they are deemed actionable per se;
and the law presumes that damages will be suffered
therefrom."
Id.

(Even though not explicitly stated, this seems to be Utah's standard

for what is commonly referred to as a crime of "moral turpitude" which is a
standard to determine which crimes should be actionable per se.

-6-

The

Appellant

maintains that his fact situation falls within that standard.

See 50 Am Jur 2d §28, p.540 (1970) (the words must charge a crime involving
moral turpitude, or a criminal or disgraceful charge; the words must state
or imply a discreditable or disgraceful thing, some wrongdoing, some
circumstance which will expose the complaining party to contempt or scorn).
Under the circumstances of that case, the Supreme Court expressed
no doubt that the Defendant's statements (the statements referring to the
Appellant

being a clever crook, etc.) could reasonably be regarded as

falling within the rule of law just stated. JkL
From the foregoing, it is clear that the present case would also
be "reasonably regarded as falling within the same rule of law" making the
Respondents 1
Respondent

statements about the Appellant

actionable per se.

The

stated that the Appellant was involved in a cover-up of a

criminal investigation (when looking at the broadcast in its entirety).
This allegation makes an even more persuasive case for the argument that
the Respondents 1 remarks were actionable per se.

The allegation of a

cover-up of a criminal investigation is more serious and potentially
injurious than a statement that the Appellant

is a "clever crook" and

"stealing from his children" which has been held to be actionable per se by
this court.

Therefore, the trial court was in error in concluding that the

Respondents1 statements about the Appellant

were not, as a matter of law,

actionable per se.
The Respondent argued in the court below that All red v. Cook, 590
P.2d 318 (Utah 1979), is dispositive of the instant case; but, Al1 red
clearly distinguishable. In All red, the Respondents
27 charges against the Appellant.

is

stated that they had

The court held that the term "charges"
-7-

could have implied conduct attributable to his individual character and
therefore was not actionable because slander per se must relate to the
Appellant's professional reputation, not his personal reputation; since the
charges were capable of two interpretations they were not actionable per
j>e.

ld_ at 321.
Under the present facts, that argument is not applicable.

The

Appellant maintains that the Respondents1 statements concerning him imputed
criminal conduct. An allegation of criminal conduct is one of the four
arbitrary categories under slander per se in which an Appellant
recover without an allegation of special damages.
41 (Utah 1983).

can

Baum v. Gill am, 667 P.2d

There is nothing in the case law that indicates that the

four categories are overlapping, i.e., that in order to constitute slander
per se under a charge of criminal conduct, it is necessary to prove conduct
incompatible with the exercise of a lawful business, trade, profession, or
office

as well as criminal conduct.

On the contrary, these categories

represent four separate and distinct concepts that are disjunctive in their
relationship to one another.

Thus, in the present case, it is irrelevant

whether the criminal conduct charged could be interpreted as applying to
either the Appellant's personal or professional reputation.
Appellant

When the

has successfully argued that Respondents 1 broadcast alleged

criminal conduct by the Appellant (in accordance with the Utah case law
cited supra), then he has satisfied the requirements of slander per se and
general damages are presumed.
The logical conclusion is that since it is irrelevant whether the
charges of criminal conduct apply to the Appellant's personal or professional reputation, it is not capable of two interpretations in the same
-8-

manner as Al 1 red and therefore Al 1 red is not dispositive of the present
case. (See Point II for in depth discussion).
B.

Respondents1 statements that the Appellant was involved in the
cover-up of a criminal investigation charges conduct incompa1>
ible with the exercise of a lawful business, trade, profession,
or office and is slanderous per se.

The rules that apply to conduct incompatible with the exercise of
a lawful business and the construction of allegedly defamatory language are
the same as those cited in the previous section.

See Baum v. Gill am, 667

P.2d 41 (Utah 1983); Western States Title Insurance Co. v. Warnock, 18 Utah
2d 70, 415 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1966) (Words construed are to be construed
according to their usual popular and common acceptance).
The Appellant

is chief investigator for the Salt Lake County

Attorney's Office as well as a peace officer and he headed a Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office corruption probe.

The facts of the present case

show that the Respondents alleged that the Appellant

was involved in the

cover-up of a Salt Lake County Attorney's Office criminal investigation
into corruption in county government.
Appellant

It seems obvious that if the

were in fact involved in such a cover-up (the Appellant

was not

involved in any such cover-up), then his actions would be in direct
conflict and indeed incompatible with the purpose of the investigation. Had
the Appellant

been so involved, his acts would have rendered him crimin-

ally liable pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-8-201, Official Misconduct;
§76-8-301, Interfering with Public Servants; §76-8-306, Obstructing
Justice; §76-8-412, Abuse of Public Records by Custodian; §76-8-508,
Witness Tampering; §76-8-510, Evidence Tampering.

-9-

It would be difficult to

imagine a stronger case of an allegation of conduct incompatible with the
exercise of a lawful profession.
The Appellant's professional reputation is his reputation among
his colleagues in the law enforcement community.
Appellant

The allegation that the

covered up a criminal investigation is a serious blow to his

credibility among his colleagues and his ability to function effectively as
a law enforcement officer.

The Second Restatements of Torts §559, comment

b, treats this in the following way:
"In the application of this idea [defamatory communication] it is enough that the communication would tend to
prejudice the Appellant in the eyes of a substantial
and respectable minority, but in such a case it must be
shown that the communication did reach one or more
persons of that minority group. This would normally be
presumed, if the communication was a public one which
was made in the newspaper or over radio or television.
[Emphasis added]
PROSSER

AND KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §111 at 774 (5th ed.

1984). Not only would those in the law enforcement community understand
such a cover-up in its common and popular acceptance, but they would also
realize that it would be a violation of the above-mentioned Code sections.
Therefore, under the applicable principles of slander per se and specifically conduct incompatible with the exercise of a lawful profession, the
Respondents1 allegations of a cover-up is actionable per se.
Again, the Al 1 red case is distinguishable from the present case
where the court held that since the 27 "charges" could have applied to
either the Appellant's personal or professional reputation, that it was
capable of two different interpretations and therefore, not actionable per
se.

This court was correct in its determination because there is no way

-10-

f o r the person hearing the allegations of "charges" to know whether they
applied t o a personal or professional
s i t u a t i o n is clearly distinguishable.

reputation.

The present

fact

The allegation of conduct incompat-

i b l e w i t h the exercise of a lawful profession is the cover-up of the
criminal

i n v e s t i g a t i o n of which the Respondent

was the head.

I t is not

reasonable to think that the cover-up of a criminal investigation could in
some way apply to the Appellant's personal reputation when the broadcast
s p e c i f i c a l l y r e f e r r e d to his conduct in an i n v e s t i g a t i o n and f u r t h e r
r e f e r r e d to his professional

title.

This s p e c i f i c reference to the

A p p e l l a n t ' s professional conduct was missing in All red making i t inapplicable to the present case.
POINT II

IF RESPONDENTS1 CHARGES AGAINST APPELLANT ARE CAPABLE OF
TWO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS, IT IS A QUESTION FOR THE
JURY TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE DEFAMATORY INTERPRETATION
WAS IN FACT SO UNDERSTOOD.
A.

If the Respondents1 charges against the Appellant that he was
involved in the cover-up of a criminal investigation are
ambiguous or capable of two different meanings, then it is a
question of fact to be decided by the jury.

There seems to be no disagreement as to the proper role the court
and jury play in determining what is capable of being defamatory and
actionable per se. The general rule is that it is first for the court to
determine whether the words are reasonably capable of a particular defamatory meaning; it is then a question for the jury to determine whether the
words were so understood. Fairbanks Publishing Co. v. Pitka, 376 P.2d 190,
194 (Alaska 1962); Til ton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 459 P.2d 8,17-18 (Wash
1969); Troutman v. Erlandson, 593 P.2d 793, 796 (Or.1979); Weeks v. M-P
-11-

Publications, Inc., 516 P.2d 193, 195 (Idaho 1973); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
TORTS, §614; PROSSER AND KEETON, at 781.

The Washington Supreme Court

stated that a determination as to whether defamation is reasonably capable
of being actionable per se should be submitted to the jury in "all but
extreme cases."

Amsbury v. Cowles Publishing Co., 458 P.2d 882, 885-886

(Wash 1969).
The allegation that the Appellant

was involved in the cover-up of

a criminal investigation is slander per se.

This is true whether the

allegations fall within charges of criminal conduct or conduct incompatible
with the exercise of a lawful profession.

Therefore, since the Respon-

dents1 defamatory statements are reasonably capable of being slanderous per
se, the issue should have been submitted to the jury to determine whether
they were actually so understood.
Furthermore, when language used is capable of two different
interpretations, one of which would be defamatory and the other not, then
it is for the jury to determine which interpretation would be given the
words by those who read or heard them.

Pitka, supra; PROSSER AND KEETON,

supra at 781.
In the present case, if it is determined that the Respondents1
statements are capable of two different interpretations (although it is not
clear what the innocent or non-defamatory interpretation would be), that
alone should not preclude the issue from going to the jury to determine
whether the Respondents1 statements concerning the Appellant , in order to
constitute defamation per se, the words alone on their face must give rise
to a presumption of damages. However, it does not follow that the interpretation of such words must be made by the court in order to be actionable
-12-

per se.

Conversely, all the case authority requiring that a slander per

se determination can and ought to be made by the jury in the most situations. See

Pitka, Cowles Publishing Co., Weeks v. M-F Publications, Inc.,

Troutman, Supra. When a factual issue of defamation per se is to be decided
by the jury, the jurors should make their determination from the words
alone, as they appear on their face, as would a court in its initial
determination.

No extrinsic facts are necessary to decide the per se issue

as would be the case in libel per quod.

See All red v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318

(Utah 1979).
This conclusion is entirely consistent with Al 1 red.

In Al 1 red,

the Appellant's theory was obviously one of slander per se, more specifically arguing that the Respondents 1 statements that they had 27 "charges"
against him imputed conduct incompatible with the exercise of a lawful
business, trade, profession, or office.
case, the Appellant

All red at 320.

However, in that

did not claim that his reputation had been damaged

under the separate slander per se category of a charge of criminal conduct.
Therefore, in order for the Appellant

to recover in that case, he had to

show that the words "charges" applied only to his professional reputation-not his personal reputation.

The reason for this was that the Appellant

was only alleging damage to his professional reputation under that specific
category of slander per se.
The Supreme Court held that the words "27 charges against you"
were too general to infer criminal conduct by the Appellant

and rejected

the Appellant's argument that it would be conduct incompatible with his
profession and thus actionable per se.

Since the allegedly defamatory

words in Al1 red were too general, they could apply to both the Appellant's
-13-

personal and professional reputation and they would thus be capable of two
different interpretations:

one applying to the Appellant's professional

reputation (which could be potentially actionable per s e ) , the other
applying to his personal reputation (which is not actionable per se under
this specific category). If the Appellant

in Al 1 red had alleged that his

personal reputation had been damaged under the separate slander per se
category of a charge of criminal conduct, then there would not have been
the problem with the charge applying to the Appellant's personal reputation; because a charge of criminal conduct under the slander per se
category can apply to both personal and professional reputation.
Under the present facts, the Appellant

is alleging that the

Respondents charged him with both criminal conduct and conduct incompatible
with the exercise of a lawful profession.

Since criminal conduct is

actionable per se if it relates to either the Respondents 1 personal ^r
professional reputation, the problem of two different interpretations in
Al1 red poses no obstacle to the Respondents1 case.
The holding in Al1 red is a narrow one.

It stands for the proposi-

tion that conduct incompatible with a lawful business, trade, profession,
or office must refer to the Respondents1 professional reputation in order
to be actionable per se and to give rise to a presumption of damages.

If

such conduct could apply to a personal reputation, then it would be capable
of two different interpretations vis a vis the slander per se standard of
conduct and could not be actionable at all.

That concept is substantially

different than the concept Appellant is presenting here.
In the present case, if the language of the entire newscast
alleging a cover-up of a criminal investigation is such that it is capable
-14-

of two different interpretations, the persuasive case authority requires
the issue be submitted to the jury.

It does not dictate, (contrary to

those who misconstrue All red), that such an issue be decided as a matter of
law by the trial court.
CONCLUSION
The Respondents 1 statements concerning the Appellant
tory and actionable per se.

They allege that the Appellant

are defama-

had engaged in

criminal conduct and conduct incompatible with the exercise of a lawful
business, trade, profession, or office and is therefore sufficient to be
actionable per se without any proof of special damages.

This determination

can be made from the words alone as recited in the Respondents1 broadcasts
without any recourse to extrinsic facts to render it defamatory.
The Respondents 1 statements are clearly capable of a defamatory
and slanderous meaning as per se.

However, the issue created here is a

factual one to be determined by a jury.

It is for the jury to determine

whether the words, once determined capable of a defamatory meaning, were in
fact so understood.

The issue of whether the Respondents' broadcast was

capable of a defamatory meaning has been clearly established and it was
error by the trial court not to have allowed the issue to be submitted to
the jury for a determination.
The Respondents 1 statements cannot reasonably be seen as capable
of two different interpretations, one defamatory and the other innocent. In
any event, the general rule is that in such cases the issue should be
submitted to the jury to determine which interpretation was in fact
understood.

The principle applied in Al1 red is separate from this general

rule; it has narrow application where conduct incompatible with a lawful
-15-

business or profession can be interpreted as applying to personal reputation rendering the language non-actionable.

The present case does not fall

within that narrow rule and should therefore be allowed to be tried at the
trial court for a resolution of the factual issues.
The Appellant's standing in his profession has been

substantially

damaged as a result of the Respondents1 untrue and unfair news broadcast.
To extend this courts ruling in Al1 red to the instant case where facts
plead are substantially different would have the effect of doing away with
the cause of action of slander per se in the State of Utah. Appellant
submits this court did not intend such a result.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

7

day of October, 1985.

BIELE, H A S L A M ^ HATCH

David 0. Black,
^
Attorneys for Appellant
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

: ss.
)

David 0. Black, being duly sworn, says:
That he is employed in the office of Biele, Haslam & Hatch,
attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, Don Harman.
That he mailed four (4) true and accurate copies of Appellant's
Brief upon the parties to the within described action addressed to:
Donald J* Purser,
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
and by mailing the same with the United States Post Office, first class,
postage prepaid, on the
**> day of October, 1985.

David 0. Black
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

My Commission Expires:
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7 ^ day of October, 1985,
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DAVID 0. BLACK #0346, of
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
Attorney for Plaintiff
50 West Broadway, Fourth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 328-1666
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DON HARMAN,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT

v.
UNITED TELEVISION, INC.
a Delaware corporation dba
KTVX TV; PHIL RIESEN,
individually and as an employee
of KTVX TV; and JOHN HARRINGTON,
individually and as an employee
of KTVX TV; and DOES I through
X,

, . > ,»-"•r-"'Q

Civil No.

Defendant,
The Plaintiff, Don Harman hereby complains of the Defendant and
for cause of action alleges as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. The Plaintiff is an investigator and employed by the Salt Lake
County Attorney's Office and has been for the past 15 years.
2.

The Plaintiff currently holds the position of Chief

Investigator for the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office and is a peace
officer.

*?.

3.

At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff has had the confidence

of his employer and was of good reputation in the community and among his
colleagues and peers in the law enforcement community until publication by
Defendants of the defamatory remarks set forth below*
4.

Plaintiff's reputation as an honest and outstanding police

officer-investigator is essential to his ability to perform his employment
to the standards set by his employment.
5.

The Defendant, Phil Riesen is a resident of Salt Lake County,

State of Utah and at all times relevant hereto was employed as a newscaster
by the Defendant United Television, Inc.
6.

The Defendant, John Harrington is a resident of Salt Lake

County, State of Utah and at all times relevant and hereto was employed as
a newscaster by the Defendant, United Television, Inc.
7.

The Defendant, United Television, Inc. owns and operates a

television broadcasting station having the call letters KTVX.
8.

The Defendant, United Television, Inc. the Delaware

corporation doing business as KTVX TV (hereinafter referred to as "KTVX")
broadcasting its programs at approximately 5:30 o'clock and 10:00 p.m.
weekdays and said programs are viewed and heard by a large audience
throughout the state of Utah and the intermountain west.
9.

During the Defendant, KTVX's news broadcast on or about

November 8, 1984, at 10:00 p.m. the Defendant Phil Riesen, an employee of
KTVX stated "the news comes amid the allegations that a recent Salt Lake
County Attorney's investigation on the same subject may entail a cover up."

-2-
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10.

The Defendant's broadcast was heard throughout Utah and the

intermountain west by many thousands of viewers.
11.

The Defendants broadcast about the Plaintiff placed Plaintiff

in a false light and portrayed Plaintiff as being involved in a cover up.
It attributed dishonest actions to the Plaintiff all of which is defamatory and made in wanton and reckless disregard the facts and the Plaintiff's reputation in the community.
12.

On Defendant KTVX's news shows on or about November 8, 1984

at about 10:00 p.m. and or about November 9, 1984 the Defendant, John
Harrington, an employee of KTVX narrated a television broadcast displaying
a picture of the Plaintiff stating
"Don Harman is the chief investigator for the
Salt Lake County Attorneyfs Office. As such he
supervised the corruption probe of the County
Constable operation. As part of that he
investigated a car sale that took place at this
West Valley City car lot. At least one Constable
called that sale illegal. Don Harman participated in the sale, putting him in the position of
investigating himself. Here is what happened:
West Valley City Constable, Scott Stowers picked
up an $8,000 car on a court order. Stowers was
the focus of the County's Probe. Salt Lake County
Constable, Lynn Huffman says the sale was kept
secret so insiders had a chance to get the car
cheap. Harman bid low. The vehicle ended up
going for $3,200. This report is the fruit of
the County Attorney's Constable corruption and
investigation. Even though the probe uncovered
wrong doing, it fell short of criminal charges. *"
In an interview today, County Attorney Ted Cannon
said he was personally investigating Harman's
investigation in the car sale. We asked Cannon
if Harman's actions may have dampened Harman's
zeal to pursue the corruption probe further. Said
Cannon "I can't say that isn't so". Now that the
Attorney's General Office and the Salt Lake City
Police Department are both investigating the
corruption of the Constable system, and now that
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the County Attorney's investigation has been
reopened, Law Enforcement officials are saying
privately they expect criminal charges to be
filed and that those charges may even extend in
the State Department of Social Services.
14.

Defendants broadcast was heard throughout Utah and the

intermountain West and by many thousands of viewers.
15.

Defendants broadcasts about Plaintiff were false, malicious,

defamatory and made in reckless disregard the facts.
16.

Defendants broadcast exposed Plaintiff to public hatred,

contempt ridicule and injured him in his profession and in his community.
17.

Defendants broadcast containing the false libelous and

defamatory information complained of herein has caused the Plaintiff to
suffer great mental anguish, pain, suffering and humiliation to which
Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages against the Defendant and each of
them in the sum of $25,000.
18.

Defendants broadcast containing false libelous and defamatory

information complained of herein, has damaged his reputation in the amount
of $50,000.
19.

Defendants broadcast was malicious or made in wanton and

reckless disregard of the facts for which Plaintiff should be awarded
punitive damages in the sum of $100,000.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
20.

Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 19 of his first

cause of action and realleges the same herein.
21.

The context of the broadcast by the Defendants about the

Plaintiff implied that Plaintiff was, and his acts violated the law.
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Viewers understood the broadcast to mean that Plaintiff was dishonest and
was engaged in illegal activities.
22.

On November 9, 1984 at about 4:00 p.m. Plaintiff contacted

Defendant KTVX by telephone and told the Defendant about the inaccuracy of
the above referenced broadcast during November 8, 1984 and as a result of
those conversations, Defendant KTVX again aired the broadcast after
receiving said information on its newscast on November 9, 1984.
23.

Plaintiff has demanded a retraction and apology pursuant to

45-2-1.5 Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) and Defendant has failed to
comply.
24.

On or about November 20, 1984, the Plaintiff contacted the

Defendant KTVX and requested that the Defendant produce the video tape of
the November 9, 1984 5:30 p.m. newscast which the Defendant refused to do
in violation of Section 45-1-5 Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
25.

Defendants broadcast containing the false libelous and

defamatory information complained of herein has caused the Plaintiff to
suffer great mental anguish, pain, suffering and humiliation to which
Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages against the Defendant and each of
them in the sum of $25,000.
26.

Defendants broadcast containing false libelous and defamatory

information complained of herein has damaged his reputation in the amount
of $50,000.
27.

Defendants broadcast was malicious or made in wanton and

reckless disregard of the facts for which Plaintiff should be awarded
punitive damages in the sum of $100,000.
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendant,
jointly and severely as follows:
1.

$25,000 for mental and physical suffering for the Defendants

broadcast on November 8, 1984.
2.

$50,000 for damage to his reputation for the Defendants

broadcast on November 8, 1984.
3.

$100,000 for punitive damages for the Defendants broadcast on

November 8, 1984.
4.

$25,000 for mental and physical suffering for the Defendants

broadcast on November 9, 1984.
5.

$50,000 for damaged to his reputation for the Defendants

broadcast on November 9, 1984.
6.

$100,000 for punitive damages for the Defendants broadcast on

November 9, 1984.
7.

For such other and further relief as this court deems proper

in the premises.
DATED this ^^

day of December, 1984.

Plaintiff's Address:
3836 Rosemary Hunter
Salt Lake City, Utah
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< ^ ; : D IN CLERK'SOFflC£
Sal? Lake County ' ilzh

JUL 2 3 1985
DONALD J. PURSER, #2663
Attorney for defendants
520 Boston Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-0441

"

To Hsf*'** c,tt?-*y c*t Court
^
^^^^-/^r'
->-yf <

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DON HARMAN,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

)

ORDER

)

Civil No. C84-7528

)

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

UNITED TELEVISION, INC, , et al.J
Defendants.

)

On July 15, 1985, defendants (KTVX-TV) moved this Court for
an Order granting them Summary Judgment in their favor.
KTVX-TV was represented by Donald J. Purser, Esq.

Plaintiff

was represented by David Black, Esq.
The Court having reviewed the Memoranda filed by counsel and
having heard oral arguments thereon, finds as follows.
The broadcasts which form the bases for plaintiff's causes
of action do not give rise to a cognizable claim for defamation
per se«

Plaintiff failed to plead special damages and therefore,

he cannot even maintain an action for defamation per quod.
Accordingly, the allegations filed by plaintiff against the
defendants are ORDERED to be DISMISSED, with prejudice and on the

merits inasmuch as plaintiff has no cause of action, costs to the
defendant.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

z3 fas'.

BY THB COURT:

JSENNKITH RIGTRUP
M l I CO I

H. DIXON HINDLEY
CLERK
Deoutv CieflT

76-8-109

CRIMINAL CODE

76-8-109. Failure of member of legislature to disclose interest in mea*.
lire or bilL—Every member of the legislature who has a personal or private
interest in any measure or bill proposed or pending before the legislature of
which he is a member and do6s not disclose the fact to the house of which
he is a member and votes thereon is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
History: O. 1953, 76-8-109, enacted by
I* 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-109.

Part 2
Abase of Office
76-8-201. Official misconduct—Unauthorized acts or failure of duty.—
A public servant is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, with an intent to
benefit himself or another or to harm another, he knowingly commits an
unauthorized act which purports to be an act of his office, or knowingly
refrains from performing a duty imposed on him by law or clearly inherent
in the nature of his office.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-201, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-201.
Cross-References.
Penalty for receiving illegal fees, 21-713 to 21-7-15.

Collateral References.
Officers<§=>121.
67
C.J.S. Officers § 133.
63 Am
- J u r - 2 d 837> Public Officers and
Employees § 346.

76-8-202. Official misconduct—Unlawful acts based on "inside" information.—A public servant is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, knowing
that official action is contemplated or in reliance on information which he
has acquired by virtue of his office or from another public servant, which
information has not been made public, he:
(1) Acquires or divests himself of a pecuniary interest in any property, transaction, or enterprise which may be affected by such action or information ; or
(2) Speculates or wagers on the basis of such action or information; or
(3) Knowingly aids another to do any of the foregoing.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-202, enacted by
L. 1973, en. 196, § 76-8-202.

Collateral References.
Officers<£=*121.
67 C.J.S. Officers § 133.
63 Am. Jur. 2d 837, Public Officers and
Employees § 346.

76-8-203. Unofficial misconduct.—(1) A person is guilty of unofficial
misconduct if he exercises or attempts to exercise any of the functions of a
public office when:
(a) He has not taken and filed the required oath of office; or
(b) He has failed to execute and file the required bond; or
(c) He has not been elected or appointed to office; or
172
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76-8-301

(d) He exercises any of the functions of his office after his term has
expired and the successor has been elected or appointed and has qualified,
or after his office has been legally removed.
(e) He knowingly withholds or retains from his successor in office or
other person entitled to the official seal or any records, papers, documents,
or other writings appertaining or belonging to his office or mutilates or
destroys or takes away the same.
(2) Unofficial misconduct is a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-203, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-203.

Constitutionality of statute requiring, or
limiting, selection or appointment of public officers or agents from members of a
political party or parties, 170 A. L. R. 198.
Time as of which eligibility or ineligibility to office is to be determined, 143
A. L. R. 1026.

Collateral References.
Oflicers<S=>121.
67 C.J.S. Officers § 133.
63 Am. Jur. 2d 837, Public Officers and
Employees § 046.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Mandamus of de facto officers.
Mandamus could issue against de facto
drainage district officers who had not
made oath and filed bond required by stat-

ute to compel them to perform duties they
d already voluntarily assumed to do.
Colorado Development Co. v. Creer, 96 U.
l
> 80 p- 2 d 914«
hfl

Parts
Obstructing Governmental Operations
76-8-301. Interference with public servant.—A person is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor if he uses force, violence, intimidation, or engages in
any other unlawful act with a purpose to interfere with a public servant
performing or purporting to perform an official function.
History: C. 1963, 76-8-301, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-301.

58 Am. Jur. 2d 862, Obstructing Justice
§ 10.

Collateral References.
Obstructing Justice<S=>2.
67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice § 1.

Criminal liability for obstructing process as affected by invalidity or irregularlty of the process, 10 A. L. B. 3d 1146.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Elements of offense.
ficer
To make out offense it must have appeared that (a) duly constituted public
officer, (b) engaged in performance of offinal duty, (c) had been obstructed or re•»»sted
by defendant. State v. Sandman, 4
l
' (2d) 69, 286 P. 2d 1060.
Umversity security officer who arrested
"indent m area where sole interests of uni^r(, rsity were location of fraternity and
li£ious institute for students was not
'liHchargmg, or attempting to discharge,
"ny duty of his office, and subsequent in^rference with arrest by fellow student
*aa not resistance or obstruction of of-

est
111

in discharge of duty. State in Inter° f Hurley, 28 IT. (2d) 248, 501 P. 2d

»
Employer who refused to bring employee out of factory so that deputy sheriff
could serve her with small claims court
order was not obstructing officer in performing his duty where employer had no
objections to service during various work
breaks, including coffee, but not during
working hours, since particular manufacturing process became dangerous if work
were impeded. State v. Ludlow, 28 XJ. (2d)
434, 503 P. 2d 1210.
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Game wardens.
Game wardens, were by law peace officers who had same power and followed
same procedure in making arrests as other
peace officers. State v. Sandman, 4 U. (2d)
69, 286 P. 2d 1060.
Defendant's refusal to permit game
warden to inspect his bait and subsequent
disposal of bait amounted to obstruction
or resistance of officer in performance of
his duty; since game warden had identified
himself after his suspicions had been
aroused, his request to see bait was not

unreasonable and was consistent with his
duty. s t a t e v - Sandman, 4 U. (2d) 69,
^86 P. 2d 1060.
Indictment or information.
Under indictment of resisting officer in
discharge of his duty, specific duty attempted to have been discharged and to
which resistance was offered should have
been alleged in information, and proof offered must have supported allegations of
information. State v. Beckendorf, 79 U.
360, 10 P. 2d 1073.

76-8-302. Picketing or parading in or near court.—A person is guilty of
a class B misdemeanor if he pickets or parades in or near a building which
houses a court of this state with intent to obstruct access to that court or
to affect the outcome of a case pending before that court.
History: O. 1953, 76-8-302, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-302.
CoUateral References.
Obstructing Justice*©^.

67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice § 7.
58 Am. Jur. 2d 856, Obstructing Justice
S3.
°
Picketing of court or judge as contempt,
58 A. L. E. 3d 1297.

76-8-303. Prevention of legislature or public servants from meeting or
organizing.—A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he intentionally and by force or fraud :
(1) Prevents the legislature, or either of the houses composing it, or
any of the members thereof, from meeting or organizing; or
(2) Prevents any other public servant from meeting or organizing to
perform a lawful governmental function.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-303, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-303.
_ „ A „_ m
CoUateral Eeferences.
Disturbance of Public Assemblage*©^.

27 C.J.S. Disturbance of Public Meetings § 1.
24 Am. Jur. 2d 141, Disturbing Meetings
§ 1#
°

76-8-304. Disturbing legislature or official meeting.—(1) A person is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor if:
(a) He intentionally disturbs the legislature, or either of the houses
composing it, while in session; or
(b) He intentionally commits any disorderly conduct in the immediate
view and presence of either house of the legislature, tending to interrupt
its proceedings or impair the respect of its authority; or
(c) Intentionally disturbs an official meeting or commits any disorderly
conduct in immediate view and presence of participants in an official meeting tending to interrupt its proceedings.
(2) "Official meeting," as used in this section, means any lawful meeting of public servants for the purposes of carrying on governmental functions.
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History: C. 1953, 76-8-304, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-304.

76-8-306

24 Am. Jur. 2d 141, Disturbing Meetings
§1.
Law Reviews.
The King's Peace: Riot Law in Its Historical Perspective, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 240.

Collateral References.
Disturbance of Public Assemblage<@=»l.
27 C.J.S. Disturbance of Public Meetings § 1.

76-8-305. Unconstitutional.
Constitutionality.
Section 76-8-305 (L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8305) which made it unlawful to intentionally interfere with recognized law enforcement official seeking to detain interferor

or another, regardless of whether there
was legal basis for arrest, was unconstitutionally vague. State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.
2d 800.

76-8-306. Obstructing justice.—(1) A person is guilty of an offense
if, with intent to hinder, prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension,
prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for the commission of
a crime, he:
(a) Knowing an offense has been committed, conceals it from a magistrate ; or
(b) Harbors or conceals the offender; or
(c) Provides the offender a weapon, transportation, disguise, or other
means for avoiding discovery or apprehension; or
(d) Warns such offender of impending discovery or apprehension; or
(e) Conceals, destroys, or alters any physical evidence that might aid
in the discovery, apprehension, or conviction of such person; or
(f) Obstructs by force, intimidation, or deception anyone from performing an act which might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution or conviction of such person.
(2) An offense under this section is a class B misdemeanor unless the
actor knows that the offender committed a capital offense or a felony of
the first degree, in which case it is a felony of the second degree.
History: O. 1953, 76-8-306, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-306.
Cross-References.
Proceedings of grand jury to be kept
secret, 77-19-10.
Conviction of one assisted unnecessary.
Conviction of the offender for a capital
<»flVnse or first degree felony is not a
prerequisite to convicting defendant of a
x'-ond degree felony for a violation of
"i«s section. State v. Bingham, 575 P. 2d
11*7.

Knowledge of capital offense or first decree felony.
Evidence that defendant heard gun*t!l!'ots and then aided his friend who did
*' shooting in escaping from the scene

was insufficient to establish that defendant knew that a homicide had been committed where there was no direct proof
that defendant was at the scene of the
shooting or that he was told by his friend
what had happened. State v. Bingham,
575 P. 2d 197.
Collateral References.
Obstructing Justice<£=*2.
67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice § 1.
58 Am. Jur. 2d 854, Obstructing Justice
§i.
Dispute over custody as affecting
charge of obstructing or resisting arrest, 3 A. L. E. 1290.
What constitutes offense of obstructing
or resisting officer, 48 A„ L. E. 746.
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Elements of offense.
University security officer who arrested
student in area where sole interests of
university were location of fraternity and
religious institute for students was not
discharging, or attempting to discharge,
any duty of his office, and subsequent interference with arrest by fellow student
was not resistance or obstruction of officer in discharge of duty. State in interest of Hurley, 28 U. (2d) 248, 501 P. 2d
111.
Employer who refused to bring employee out of factory so that deputy sheriff could serve her with small claims court
order was not obstructing officer in performing his duty where employer had no
objections to service during various work
breaks, including coffee, but not during
working hours, since particular manufacturing process became dangerous if work
were impeded. State v. Ludlow, 28 U. (2d)
434, 503 P. 2d 1210.
Game wardens.
Game wardens were by law peace of-

fleers who bad same power and followed
same procedure in making arrests as other
peace officers. State v. Sandman, 4 XJ. (2d)
69, 286 P. 2d 1060.
Defendant's refusal to permit game
warden to inspect his bait and subsequent
disposal of bait amounted to obstruction
or resistance of officer in performance of
his duty; since game warden had identified himself after his suspicions had been
aroused, his request to see bait was not
unreasonable and was consistent with his
duty. State v. Sandman, 4 U. (2d) 69, 286
P. 2d 1060.
Scope and operation.
Former statute which prohibited disclosure of grand jury proceedings did not
forbid disclosure when required by court,
as where grand juror was called to testify
before petit jury regarding confession
made by defendant when testifying voluntarily before grand jury. United States
v. Kirkwood, 5 U. 123, 126, 13 P. 234.

1

76-8-307. Failure to aid peace officer.—A person is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor if, upon command by a peace officer identifiable or identified
by him as such, he unreasonably fails or refuses to aid the peace officer in
effecting an arrest or in preventing the commission of any offense by
another person.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-307, enacted by
L. 1973, eh. 196, § 76-8-307.

Cross-Eeferences.
Officer may command assistance, 77-5-1.

76-8-308. Acceptance of bribe or bribery to prevent criminal prosecution—Defense.—(1) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he:
(a) Solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit as consideration
for his refraining from initiating or aiding in a criminal prosecution; or
(b) Confers, offers, or agrees to confer any benefit upon another as
consideration for the person refraining from initiating or aiding in a
criminal prosecution;
(2) It is an affirmative defense that the value of the benefit did not
exceed an amount which the actor believed to be due as restitution or
indemnification for the loss caused or to be caused by the offense.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-308, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-308.
Cross-References.
Bribery involving tampering with or retaliation against a witness or informant,
76-8-508.
Extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal
proceeding, 76-8-509.

CoUateral References.
Extortion<S=*l.
35 C.J.S. Extortion § 1.
31 Am. Jur. 2d 900, Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 1.
Communicating with grand jury or
member thereof as a criminal offense, 112
A. L. R. 319.
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History: 0. 1953, 76-8-409, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-409.

76-8-412

Collateral References.
Taxation<£=>310.
85 C.J.S. Taxation § 1025.
72 Am. Jur. 2d 59, State and Local
Taxation § 727.

76-8-410. Doing business without license.—Every person who commences or carries on any business, trade, profession, or calling, for the transaction or carrying on of which a license is required by any law, or by
any county, city, or town ordinance, without taking out the license required
by law or ordinance is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
History: 0. 1953, 76-8-410, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-410.

Collateral References.
Licenses<§=*40.
53 C.J.S. Licenses § 66.
51 Am. Jur. 2d 75, Licenses and Permits § 72.

76-8-411. Trafficking in warrants.—No state, county, city, town, or district officer shall, either directly or indirectly, contract for or purchase
any warrant or order issued by the state, county, city, town, or district of
which he is an officer, at any discount whatever upon the sum due on the
warrant or order, and, if any state, county, city, town, or district officer
shall so contract for or purchase any such order or warrant on a discount,
he is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
History: O. 1953, 76-8-411, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-411.

CoUateral References.
States<§=>136.
81 C.J.S. States § 168.
63 Am. Jur. 2d 837, Public Officers and
Employees § 346.

76-8-412. Stealing, destroying or mutilating public records by custodian.—Every officer having the custody of any record, map, or book, or
of any paper or proceedings of any court, filed or deposited in any public
office, or placed in his hands for any purpose, who is guilty of stealing, willfully destroying, mutilating, defacing, altering, falsifying, removing, or
accreting the whole or any part thereof, or who permits any other person
*o to do, is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
History: O. 1953, 76-8-412, enacted by
I* 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-412.
Oross-References.
Forgery, 76-6-501.
, Fraudulent handling of recordable writ'"C", 76-6-503.
Tampering with records, 76-6-504.

CoUateral References.
Officers<S=>121.
67 C.J.S. Officers § 133.
63 Am
- J u r - 2<i 837> Public Officers and
Em lovees
P
§ 346-

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
nmptions.
it was a felony to falsify court
it was presumed records of court
• * correct and that those who had

lnro
JH,or<'«,
f

access to them had not falsified them;
this presumption extended to juvenile
court records. In re State in Interest of
* Graham, 110 U. 159, 170 P. 2d 172.
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76-8-508

76-8-502 (2), falsity of a statement may not be established solely through
contradiction by the testimony of a single witness.
(2) No prosecution shall be brought under this part when the substance
of the defendant's false statement is his denial of guilt in a previous criminal trial.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-505, enacted by
L. 1973, eh. 196, §76-8-505.

76-8-506. False reports of offenses to law enforcement officer.—A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he:
(1) Knowingly gives or causes to be given false information to any
law enforcement officer with a purpose of inducing the officer to believe that
another has committed an offense; or
(2) Knowingly gives or causes to be given information to any law
enforcement officer concerning the commission of an offense, knowing
that the offense did not occur or knowing that he has no information
relating to the offense or danger.
History: O. 1953, 76-8-506, enacted by
L. 1973, clL 196, §76-8-506.

76-8-507. False name or address to law enforcement officer.—A person
commits a class C misdemeanor if, with intent of misleading a law enforcement officer as to his identity, he knowingly gives a false name or address
to a law enforcement officer in the lawful discharge of his official duties.
History: O. 1953, 76-8-507, enacted by
L. 1973, ClL 196, §76-8-507.

76-8-508. Tampering with witness—Retaliation against witness or informant—Bribery.—A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if:
(1) Believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or
about to be instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person
to:
(a) Testify or inform falsely; or
(b) Withhold any testimony, information, document, or thing; or
(c) Elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence; or
(d) Absent himself from any proceeding or investigation to which
he has been summoned; or
(2) He commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by
another in his capacity as a witness or informant; or
(3) He solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration of his doing any of the things specified in paragraph (1).
History: C. 1953, 76-8-508, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-508.
Cross-References.
Accepting bribe, or bribery, to prevent
criminal prosecution, 76-8-308.
fiftiU.a„ , _ „
collateral References.
Hribery<@=3l(l).

11 C.J.S. Bribery § 2.
12 Am. Jur. 2d 749, Bribery § 3.
Admissibility, in prosecution for bribery
accepting bribes, of evidence tending
to show the commission of other bribery
b r a c c e ptance of bribe, 20 A. L. R. 2d
1012.
or
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76-8-509

CRIMINAL CODE

s
Falsity of contemplated testimony as
condition of offense of bribery of, attempt to bribe, or acceptance of bribe or

gift by, prospective witness, 110 A. L. R.
582.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Evidence.
In prosecution for subornation of perjury, record of plea of guilty of perjury
by person alleged to have been procured
to commit perjury was inadmissible.
State v. Justesen, 35 U. 105, 99 P. 456.
In prosecution of attorney fo^ subornation of jury, evidence was sufficient to
sustain conviction although only evidence
was testimony of person alleged to have
been suborned, since perjury and subornation of perjury were distinct offenses and
such witness was not accomplice of de-

fendant as to subornation charged. State
- Gleason, 86 U. 26, 40 P. 2d 222.
Where defendant and witness were accomplices in perjury, corroboration of
witness's testimony was unnecessary to
convict defendant of subornation. State
v
- McGee, 26 U. (2d) 373, 489 P. 2d 1188.
v

Status of crime.
Crime of subornation of perjury was
separate and distinct offense from that
of perjury. State v. Justesen, 35 U. 105,
99 P. 456.

76-8-509. Extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding.—(1) A
person is guilty of a felony of the second degree if by the use of force or
by any threat which would constitute a means of committing the crime of
theft by extortion under this code, if the threat were employed to obtain
property, or by promise of any reward or pecuniary benefits, he attempts
to induce an alleged victim of a crime to secure the dismissal of or to prevent the filing of a criminal complaint, indictment, or information.
(2) ''Victim," as used in this section, includes a child or other person
under the care or custody of a parent or guardian.
History: O. 1953, 76-8-509, enacted by
L. 1973> ch. 196, § 76-8-609.
Cross-References.
Accepting bribe, or bribery, to prevent
criminal prosecution, 76-8-308.
oUateral References.
CoUateral
Threats<§=3l(l).

86 C.J.S. Threats and Unlawful Communications § 4.
31 Am. Jur. 2d 911, Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 14.
Criminal liability of corporation for extortion, false pretenses, or similar offenses,
49 A. L. R. 3d 820

76-8-510. Tampering with evidence.—A person commits a felony of the
second degree if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is
pending or about to be instituted, he:
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything with a purpose
to impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation; or
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything which he knows to be false with
a purpose to deceive a public servant who is or may be engaged in a
proceeding or investigation.
History: O. 1953, 76-8-510, enacted by
L. 1973, en, 196, §76-8-510.

CoUateral References.
Obstructing Justice<^5.
67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice § 10.
29 Am. Jur. 2d 338, Evidence § 292.

76-8-511. Falsification or alteration of government record.—A person
is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he:
190

